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Abstract
Background: Highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses are an important health problem in many Asian
and African countries. The current increase in human cases demonstrates that influenza A(H5N1) is still a significant
global pandemic threat. Many health organizations have recognized the need for new strategies to improve
influenza global surveillance. Specifically, the World Health Organization through the global technical consultation
for influenza surveillance have called for a detailed picture of the current limitations, especially at the nation level,
to evaluate, standardize and strength reporting systems. The main goal of our study is to demonstrate the value of
genetic surveillance as part of a strategic surveillance plan. As a proof of concept, we evaluated the current
situation of influenza A(H5N1) in Asian and Africa.
Results: Our analysis revealed a power-law distribution in the number of sequences of A(H5N1) viruses analyzed
and/or reported to influenza surveillance networks. The majority of the Asian and African countries at great risk of
A(H5N1) infections have very few (approximately three orders of magnitude) sequenced A(H5N1) viruses (e.g.
hemagglutinin genes). This suggests that countries under pandemic alert for avian influenza A(H5N1) have very
limited participation (e.g. data generation, genetic analysis and data share) in avian influenza A(H5N1) surveillance.
More important, this study demonstrates the usefulness of influenza genetic surveillance to detect emerging
pandemic threat viruses.
Conclusions: Our study reveals that some countries suffering from human cases of avian influenza have limited
participation (e.g. genetic surveillance or data share) with global surveillance networks. Also, we demonstrate that
the implementation of genetic surveillance programs could increase and strengthen worldwide epidemic and
pandemic preparedness. We hope that this work promotes new discussions between policy makers and health
surveillance organizations to improve current methodologies and regulations.
Findings
The recent outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influ-
enza A(H5N1) virus in numerous countries in Asia and
Africa and the increase in human cases, demonstrate that
influenza A viruses remain a global pandemic threat
[1,2]. Worldwide, natural migrations of birds and com-
mercialization of poultry product are considered two of
the most important mechanisms of disease dispersion
[3]. Due to the high risk of the A(H5N1) pandemic
threat, multinational efforts have been made to improve
the surveillance and control of avian influenza viruses
around the world [4]. In recent years, important progress
has been accomplished in the standardization of labora-
tory techniques for the diagnostics of influenza viruses
[5], and phylogenetic nomenclature of highly pathogenic
avian influenza A(H5N1) virus [6]. These efforts have
generated establishment of advanced global networks for
influenza surveillance [7].
In response to the 2009 influenza pandemic threat, the
World Health Organization (WHO) through the global
technical consultation for influenza surveillance has
called for a detailed picture of current limitations in
national reporting systems [8,9]. An important compo-
nent of the influenza surveillance system that deserves
significant attention is the monitoring of genetic and
antigenic changes occurring in influenza viruses that cir-
culate among human and animals (e.g. [10,11]).
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be an essential tool for establishing the gene origin of
pandemic viruses, monitoring the status of an outbreak
[11,12] and design control strategies [13,14]. However,
the regular use of genetic influenza surveillance remains
limited to only a few countries. Herein, we evaluate the
extent of this problem and demonstrate the importance
of genetic surveillance during the current situation of
highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) virus in Asia
and Africa. Given the significance of this global pandemic
threat, this study provides some basis to improve our
current surveillance programs.
Surveillance of avian influenza H5N1 virus in Asia and
Africa
Information of human cases of avian influenza A(H5N1)
reported to the WHO, were retrieved from the Global
Alert and Response (GAR) system [15]. This information
has been collected under WHO policies and regulations,
and includes epidemiological data and operational infor-
mation about disease outbreaks. This system manages
critical information about outbreaks and accurate and
timely communications between international public
health professionals [16]. A written consent (WHP-
73,056) to extract and publish the data (number human
cases) was obtained from the WHO.
Avian influenza A(H5N1) have been reported in 15
countries (as of 25th March, 2011): Azerbaijan, Bangla-
desh, Cambodia, China, Djibouti, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq,
Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Nigeria,
Pakistan, Thailand, Turkey and Viet Nam [15]. Because
other countries in Asia, Africa and Europe are at promi-
nent risk of influenza outbreaks, the global network for
influenza surveillance has implemented specific surveil-
lance polices for this region [7]. To gain insights into the
current status and capacity of influenza A(H5N1) surveil-
lance in these countries, we analyzed the number of A
(H5N1) hemagglutinin (HA) sequences generated in
national disease centers and universities as an indicator of
active surveillance. Analysis of influenza HA proteins is
one of the most important tools for global influenza
surveillance network [2,17].
First, we examined the number of deposited HA
sequences in the Influenza Virus Resource, a comprehen-
sive database integrating data from the National Institute
of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), the J. Craig
Venter Institute (JCVI) and GenBank at the National Cen-
ter for Biotechnology Information (NCBI) [18]. We
retrieved and archived records for HA sequences in Asian
and African countries (all sequences available from differ-
ent hosts and environmental samples) of influenza A virus
subtype H5N1 from 2003 to 2011 (as of 25th March,
2011). A total of 2,934 HA sequences were found and
retrieved from the database. We found that the cumulative
number of sequences for this period of time (2003-2011)
varied drastically between countries (Figure 1). The analy-
sis revealed an approximation to a power law distribution
s h o w i n gs o m ed e g r e eo fi n e q u a l i t yb e t w e e nn a t i o n s .F o r
example, most of the A(H5N1) sequences (73.7%) were
obtained from a few number of countries (China, Egypt,
Vietnam, Thailand and Indonesia) and of the 36 Asian
and African countries that have performed genetic surveil-
lance of HA proteins, 50% of them have deposited less
than 10 sequences in the database between 2003 and 2011
(Additional file 1).
To verify the power law approximation in influenza
genetic surveillance, we performed two independent statis-
tical tests. First, we ranked the countries by the number of
available sequences and then we fit the data to a nonlinear
power law regression and a log-log plot using GraphPad
Prism 4 software, (GraphPad Prism, CA. USA). Second,
we performed the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for goodness-
of-fit to power law distributions [19] derived from data
variability using the lower (25th percentile), middle (50th
percentile or median), and upper (75th percentile) quar-
tiles. This statistical analysis was carried out using Stat-
View software version 5.0.1. (SAS Institute, NC. USA).
These analyses confirmed that HA gene sequences
archived in the in the Influenza Virus Resource have an
approximation to a power law distribution (nonlinear
power law regression, R
2 = 0.9066 and Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test P < 0.0001 for lower, middle, and upper
quartiles; Figure 2) demonstrating a strong sequencing dis-
proportion between nations. Together, these data suggest
that some of the selected nations have limited participa-
tion (e.g. data generation, genetic analysis and data share)
in the genetic surveillance of avian influenza A(H5N1) or
a limited interaction with global surveillance networks for
data share. These observations highlight the need of new
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Figure 1 Cumulative number of A(H5N1) hemagglutinin genes
sequenced in Asian and African countries and reported to
influenza surveillance networks between 2003 and 2011
approximates a power law distribution (nonlinear power law
regression, R
2 = 0.9066 and Kolmogorov-Smirnov test P
<0.0001 for lower, middle, and upper quartiles).
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Page 2 of 7polices to improve collaboration between nations affected
by influenza outbreaks.
Second, to evaluate the trends of influenza genetic sur-
veillance in countries under current avian influenza A
(H5N1) outbreaks in humans, we examined the number
of reported HA sequences from the 15 countries with
avian influenza A(H5N1) disease cases and deaths (as of
25th March, 2011) [15]. Our analysis demonstrated that
between the years 2003 and 2011, nations such as China,
Egypt, Indonesia, Thailand and Viet Nam have performed
a constant A(H5N1) genetic surveillance (Figure 3). Intri-
guingly, we observed instances of lack of A(H5N1)
genetic surveillance even when human cases and deaths
took place (e.g. Indonesia 2008, 2010, 2011 and Egypt
2011; Viet Nam 2009, Cambodia 2009, 2010, 2011).
These results indicated that in many instances, genetic
analysis of influenza A(H5N1) is used as a Ad hoc strat-
egy rather than a surveillance method. Moreover, our
results also demonstrate that genetic surveillance of
influenza viruses is performed by disease control centers
and research institutions with a limited number of
sequences per year (e.g. Cambodia, 37 HA sequences in 8
year period).
To demonstrate that some countries suffering from
human cases of avian influenza have limited participa-
tion (i.e. genetic surveillance or data share) with global
surveillance networks, we estimated the ratios between
total number of avian influenza A(H5N1) HA sequences
and total number of human cases of influenza A(H5N1)
(data collected between 2003 and 2011, as shown in
Figure 3). This analysis revealed significant differences
(P ≤ 0.016) in sequencing capability between countries
(Figure 4). For example, in Nigeria 171 A(H5N2) genes
were sequenced per human case; in contrast, in Azerbai-
jan only 0.6 genes were sequenced per human case.
These numbers represent a 285 fold difference between
these two countries. Together, these findings also indi-
cate that some nations have limited participation in the
A B
Y=A*X^B
A= 798.1  46.43
B=-0.9736 0.06032
R2= 0.9066
A
Y=B*X+ A
A= 3.608 ± 0.1341
B= -2.103 ± 0.1105
R2= 0.9142
B
95% Confidence Intervals:  
A: 703.6 to 892.5
B: -1.096 to -0.8509
B
DF 2 DF 2 DF 2
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test for lower 
quartile (25th percentile)
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test for middle 
quartile (50th percentile)
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test for upper 
(75th percentile) quartile
DF 2 DF 2 DF 2
Count, A 26 Count, A 18 Count, A 9
Count, B 10 Count, B 18 Count, B 27
Maximum Difference 1 Maximum Difference 1 Maximum Difference 1
Chi Square 28.889 Chi Square 36 Chi Square 27
PV l 00 0 0 1 PV l 00 0 0 1 PV l 00 0 0 1 P-Value < 0.0001 P-Value < 0.0001 P-Value < 0.0001
Figure 2 Power law distributions of the cumulative number of
A(H5N1) hemagglutinin genes sequenced in Asian and African
countries and reported to influenza surveillance networks
between 2003 and 2011 (data shown in Figure 1) The 36
countries were ranked by the number of reported gene
sequences to the influenza surveillance network and plotted
against the total number of sequences. A) The data was fit to a
nonlinear power law regression and the coefficients were estimated.
B) Log-Log plot (same dataset) showing a linear regression. C)
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for goodness-of-fit to power law
distributions derived from data variability using the lower, middle
(median), and upper quartiles.
C o u n t r y GCDGCDGCDGCDGCDGCDGCDGCDGCD
Indonesia 1 5 00 2 7 00 7 2 2 0 1 3 1 3 4 5 5 4 5 1 8 4 2 3 7 0 2 4 2 0 1 2 1 1 9 097033
Egypt 000000100 5 4 1 8 1 0 1 0 2 2 5 9 8 9 84 1 1 3 3 9 4 5 8 2 9 1 3 0 1 1 4
Viet Nam 19 3 3 111 29 20 124 61 19 9 0 0 106 8 5 29 6 5 0 5 5 15 7 2 0 0 0
China 56 1 1 84 0 0 263 8 5 282 13 8 34 5 3 11 4 4 6 7 4 0 2 1 0 0 0
2010 2011 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
China 56 1 1 84 0 0 263 8 5 282 13 8 34 5 3 11 4 4 6 7 4 0 2 1 0 0 0
Thailand 000 2 0 5 1 7 1 2 8 0 52 1 8 33 1 0 00 1 7 00000000000
Cambodia 000300 1 4 44 1 6 22311110010011033
Turkey 000000300 1 5 2 1 2 4 2 1 00400000000000
Azerbaijan 000000000585000000000000000
Iraq 000000000 1 0 32000000000000000
Pakistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 7 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Pakistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 7 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bangladesh 000000000000 1 3 00 1 4 10100300010
Laos* 000300000800 2 2 22 1 0 00000000000
Djibouti 000000000110000000000000000
Myanmar 000000000100310000000000000
Nigeria 000000000 1 0 5 00 6 4 11210000000000
Number of reported A(H5N1) hemagglutinin sequences from the 15 countries with avian influenza A(H5N1) cases and deaths (as of 25th March, 2011) [12].
G = Genetic surveillance [A(H5N1) hemagglutinin  sequences].
C = Human cases of influenza A(H5N1).
D = Human deaths caused by A(H5N1).
Red and yellow cells denote highest and lowest values. Scale: dark-red (highest) and light-yellow (lowest).
Source: data extracted from WHO-Global Alert and Response (http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/country/cases_table_2011_03_25/en/index.html)
with the written consent of the World Health Organization with the written consent of the World Health Organization.
*Lao People's Democratic Republic.
Figure 3 Trends of influenza genetic surveillance in countries
under current avian influenza A(H5N1) outbreaks in humans
(disease cases and deaths). Number of reported A(H5N1)
hemagglutinin sequences from the 15 countries with avian
influenza A(H5N1) cases and deaths (as of 25th March, 2011) [12]. G
= Genetic surveillance [A(H5N1) hemagglutinin sequences]. C =
Human cases of influenza A(H5N1). D = Human deaths caused by A
(H5N1). Red and yellow cells denote highest and lowest values.
Scale: dark-red (highest) and light-yellow (lowest). Source: data
extracted from WHO-Global Alert and Response http://www.who.
int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/country/cases_table_2011_03_25/en/
index.html with the written consent of the World Health
Organization. *Lao People’s Democratic Republic.
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Figure 4 Ratios between total number of avian influenza A
(H5N1) HA sequences and the total number of human cases of
influenza A(H5N1) (data between 2003 and 2011 as shown in
Figure 3). This analysis revealed significant differences between
countries. The ratio difference between Nigeria and Azerbaijan
represent a 285 fold difference. Statistical analysis was performed by
means of Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for goodness-of-fit to power law
distributions using lower (P = 0.0025), middle (P = 0.0011), and
upper (P = 0.0165) quartiles.
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Page 3 of 7genetic surveillance of avian influenza A(H5N1) or a
limited interaction with global surveillance networks for
data share. This problem was recently recognized by the
WHO global technical consultation for influenza surveil-
lance. This group of experts identify that the Ad hoc
surveillance strategy is easy to use but is least desirable
because results are biased depending on sampling
approach [8]. Together, these observations reaffirm the
need of new policies in influenza surveillance to improve
country coverage and sampling prioritization.
We recognize that our assessment has been restricted to
the genetic surveillance of A(H5N1) viruses and data
deposition in influenza global networks, and that serologi-
cal surveillance may occur in some of these countries.
Nevertheless, the main goal of our analysis is to illustrate
the current situation of some nations facing the risk of
human influenza outbreaks and their involvement with
the global influenza surveillance network.
These observations emphasize the need of new polices
to improve genetic surveillance and data share for influ-
enza surveillance. For example, a better distribution of
financial and technical sources among affected nations. To
demonstrate the importance of implementing genetic ana-
lysis and surveillance networks, we performed a retrospec-
tive and comprehensive genetic analysis of influenza A
(H5N1) viruses in these 15 Asia and Africa countries. We
analyzed A(H5N1) genetic diversity between years 2000
and 2011. A total of 2,757 sequences (as of 25th March,
2011) were retrieved from the Influenza Virus Resource at
the NCBI [18]. After removing duplicated and partial pro-
tein sequences, 1,446 HA sequences were aligned using
MUSCLE software [20], manually inspected for quality
and trimmed to equal length. Aligned sequences were
used for genetic analysis using the minimum evolution
method [21]. Analysis were performed using the MEGA4
[22] and Seaview [23] software. The statistical significance
of branch order was estimated by the generation of 50
replications of bootstrap re-sampling of the originally-
aligned nucleotide sequences.
The genetic analysis of HA proteins from influenza A
(H5N1) viruses circulating between 2000 and 2011 in the
selected Asian and African countries, revealed that A
(H5N1) viruses clustered by country and year of isolation
indicating that this virus follows regional and annual
trends (Figure 5). Also, the analysis revealed that viruses
circulating in China are highly diverse, supporting the idea
that this region represents an important source of highly
diverse pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza viruses [24]. For
example, viruses circulating in China between 2000 and
2003 are genetic similarity to those circulating in Cambo-
dia, Vietnam and Laos in the period between 2004 and
2007, and in Bangladesh between 2007 and 2010 (e.g.
Figure 5, cluster A). In many countries, recent (2008-
2011) A(H5N1) viral isolates have close homology to
viruses circulating in the period between 2004 and 2007
(e.g. Figure 5; genotype II). More important, our genetic
surveillance method was able to identify A(H5N1) viruses
with genetic distinctness, an important trait of novel and
potentially pandemic influenza viruses [12]. Together,
these results highlight the value of genetic surveillance to
accurately indentify genetic differences between influenza
viruses that circulate among humans and animals, a key
factor for the development of vaccines, outbreak prepared-
ness, and pandemic planning (e.g. [10-13,25,26]).
To corroborate our observations, we examined the ori-
gin of the viruses with genetic distinctiveness. Genotype I
(e.g. Viet Nam 2005, accession numbers ABD14806 and
ABD14808) includes highly pathogenic viruses isolated
from shell washes of duck and goose eggs confiscated
from travelers. These viruses have close homology to a
Hong Kong 97-like H5N1 influenza virus [27]. Genotype
II (e.g. Viet Nam isolates from 2008 to 2011, ACO07034,
ACO07035, ACO07036 and ACO07037) includes highly
pathogenicity and exotic H5N1 viruses isolated from
poultry seized at a port of entry into Viet Nam [28]. Gen-
otype III (e.g. China 2006, ADG59089), an exotic virus
generated through multiple reassortment events isolated
in China. Importantly, viruses with close HA protein
homology to genotype III, reacted poorly with antisera
produced from other viruses circulating in China. Based
on these observations, these viruses were cataloged as a
pandemic threat [29]. Genotype IV (e.g. Egypt 2008,
ADG28679; and 2010, ADM85867, ADM85879) includes
recent isolates of highly pathogenicity avian influenza A
(H5N1) viruses circulating in Egypt. Genotype V (USA
2007, ACZ36900 and ACZ48494) represents A(H5N1)
sequences used to validate the efficacy of this genetic
analysis to detect exotic genotypes. Genotype VI (e.g.
Viet Nam 2008, ACY06607, ACY06606, ACO07033 and
ADF83652) integrated by high pathogenicity A(H5N1)
viruses isolated from chickens seized at ports of entry in
Viet Nam [30]. These viruses were antigenically distinct
from contemporary strains circulating in Viet Nam. This
genotypic group also included A(H5N1) viruses isolated
from humans possessing unknown virulence determi-
nants involved in high pathogenicity [31]. Together,
these analyses reveal the value of genetic surveillance to
identify potential influenza pandemic threats circulating
in specific global regions.
The influenza pandemic in 2009 highlighted the need of
an improved global surveillance system. Specifically, the
last pandemic event showed the technical challenges that
many nations face to monitor influenza outbreaks when
standardized surveillance and reporting system are not
established [8]. Significant efforts have been taken by inde-
pendent research groups and the WHO to revise and stan-
dardize methodologies for data collection and reporting
systems. However, these challenges are very complex in
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the WHO global technical consultation for influenza sur-
veillance and other WHO influenza program experts
recently indentify that the lack of standardization in sur-
veillance methods results in data sets that are not compar-
able between nations and that the data cannot be
compiled to generate a comprehensive picture of the virus
spread between nations [8]. To this end, our study clearly
documents this issue. Here, we have shown that many
countries where highly pathogenic avian influenza A
(H5N1) virus represents a current pandemic threat, have a
limited participation (e.g. data generation, genetic analysis
and data share) in avian influenza A(H5N1) surveillance.
Although we cannot provide conclusive evidence explain-
ing these national trends, we presume that this issue could
be linked to the fact that some nations lack technical
sources to perform the surveillance, lack an effective
mechanism for reporting surveillance data, have limited
human sources (trained personnel, problems with internet
connectivity, etc.) or are influenced by political pressures
[8].
Importantly, the WHO global technical consultation for
influenza surveillance has also called for the description of
a detailed picture of the current limitations, especially at
the nation level [8,9]. With this in mind, here we provide
some bases to establish a strategy to overcome some of
these limitations and enhance influenza surveillance. Spe-
cifically, our analysis demonstrates that implementation of
genetic surveillance programs could strengthen worldwide
epidemic and pandemic preparedness. For example, our
study revealed that A(H5N1) viruses clustered by country
and year of isolation indicating that this virus follows
regional and annual trends. Also, our analysis identified
highly diverse (exotic) viruses co-circulating with endemic
viruses. Based on these results, we propose that genetic
s u r v e i l l a n c es y s t e ms h o u l db eak e yc o m p o n e n to fi n f l u -
enza surveillance. In particular, we believe that genetic
surveillance can be adopted worldwide even in less-
resourced areas. This idea is supported by studies demon-
strating that a few genetic sequences (less than 50
HA genes sequenced) are sufficient to effectively track the
antigentic changes occurring in influenza viruses
Genotype I 
Gt V I
Genotype II 
Genotype VI
Cluster A
Azerbaijan
Bangladesh
Cambodia
China
Genotype V 
Egypt
Indonesia
Iraq
Laos
Myanmar
Nigeria
Pakistan   
Thailand
Turkey
Viet Nam
 
 
  Genotype III 
JHQHWLFGLVWLQFWQHVV
0.01 Genotype IV
Figure 5 The genetic diversity and distinctiveness of influenza A(H5N1) viruses circulating between 2003 and 2011 in Asian and
African countries. Filled circles depict viruses isolated in 2010-2011.
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Page 5 of 7circulating in specific geographical locations and over a
period of 5-10 years [13,25]. We hope the present study
stimulates further studies and discussions to accelerate the
improvement of guidance and recommendations for influ-
enza surveillance.
In summary, the significance of the present study is at
least three fold. First, it is revealed that in many coun-
tries under current pandemic alert for avian influenza A
(H5N1), there is a limited genetic surveillance of influ-
enza A(H5N1) viruses. This is due apparently to a lim-
ited participation (e.g. data generation, genetic analysis
and data share) in avian influenza A(H5N1) surveillance.
Second, analysis of national surveillance trends revealed
that genetic analysis of influenza viruses occurred in
many cases as Ad hoc strategy but not as a surveillance
technique (prevention). Third, it is demonstrated the
usefulness of influenza genetic surveillance to detect
pandemic threat viruses. The significance of this mole-
cular approach was demonstrated in the past A(H1N1)
2009 world pandemic, in which genetic analyses were
essential to establish the origin of the new reassortant
virus [11,12]. Finally, and perhaps more important, it is
worrying that the majority of countries suffering from
human cases of avian influenza have a limited access to
genetic surveillance, even though this method is very
effective to detect exotic and highly divergent circulating
between humans, wild and farm animals. We wish that
this work promotes new discussions between policy
makers and health surveillance organizations to improve
current methodologies and regulations.
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reported to influenza surveillance networks between 2003 and 2011.
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